

This pdf is a digital offprint of your contribution in A.-C. Jacobsen (ed.), *Origeniana Undecima. Origen and Origenism in the History of Western Thought*, ISBN 978-90-429-3307-1

The copyright on this publication belongs to Peeters Publishers.

As author you are licensed to make printed copies of the pdf or to send the unaltered pdf file to up to 50 relations. You may not publish this pdf on the World Wide Web – including websites such as academia.edu and open-access repositories – until three years after publication. Please ensure that anyone receiving an offprint from you observes these rules as well.

If you wish to publish your article immediately on open-access sites, please contact the publisher with regard to the payment of the article processing fee.

For queries about offprints, copyright and republication of your article, please contact the publisher via peeters@peeters-leuven.be

BIBLIOTHECA EPHEMERIDUM THEOLOGICARUM LOVANIENSIVM

CCLXXIX

ORIGENIANA UNDECIMA
ORIGEN AND ORIGENISM
IN THE HISTORY OF WESTERN THOUGHT

Papers of the 11th International Origen Congress,
Aarhus University, 26-31 August 2013

EDITED BY

ANDERS-CHRISTIAN JACOBSEN

PEETERS
LEUVEN – PARIS – BRISTOL, CT
2016

CONTENTS

Anders-Christian JACOBSEN (Aarhus)	
Introduction	VII
I. THE RECEPTION OF ORIGEN'S THOUGHT IN MODERN THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY	
Alfons FÜRST (Münster)	
Origen's Legacy to Modern Thinking about Freedom and Autonomy.	3
Theo KOBUSCH (Bonn)	
Die Univozität des Moralischen: Zur Wirkung des Origenes in Deismus und Aufklärung.	29
Elena RAPETTI (Milan)	
The 17 th -Century French Debates on Origen's Biography	47
Peter W. MARTENS (St. Louis, MO)	
The Modern Receptions of Origen's Biblical Scholarship: A Bibliographic Essay.	67
Jana PLÁTOVÁ (Olomouc)	
Clemens' und Origenes' Auslegung der Perikope von der Berufung des reichen Jünglings (Matthäus 19,16-30 Parall.) im EKK Projekt.	87
Vít HUŠEK (Olomouc)	
Origen, Paul Ricœur and the Role of Literal Meaning.	95
Domenico PAZZINI (Verucchio)	
Samaritana (Gv 4): Origene / Bultmann.	105
Patricia Andrea CINER (San Juan, Argentina)	
Origen and the Exegesis of the Different Manuscripts of the Gospel of John.	115
Margaret A. SCHATKIN (Chestnut Hill, MA)	
The Origenism of St. John Chrysostom in the West: From St. Jerome to the Present.	125

Petr B. MIKHAYLOV (Moscow)	
The Mystery of History according to Origen: Conflict of Interpretations	139
Anders-Christian JACOBSEN (Aarhus)	
The Reception of Origen's Ideas about Universal Salvation in Danish Theology and Literature in the 19 th Century	149

II. THE RECEPTION OF ORIGEN'S WORKS IN MODERN PHILOLOGY

Christoph MARKSCHIES (Berlin)	
The Reception and Transformation of Origen's Works in Modern Editions: Some Comparative Views on Editions in Britain, France, Italy, and Germany	165
Antonio CACCIARI (Bologna)	
From Tura to Munich: Seventy Years of Origenian Discoveries	191
Lorenzo PERRONE (Bologna)	
The Find of the Munich Codex: A Collection of 29 Homilies of Origen on the Psalms.	201
Cordula BANDT (Berlin)	
The Reception of Origen's Homilies on Psalms in the Catenae	235
Emanuela PRINZIVALLI (Rome)	
A Fresh Look at Rufinus as a Translator	247
Franz Xaver RISCH (Berlin)	
Zur lateinischen Rezeption der <i>Scholia in Psalmos</i> von Origenes	277
Barbara VILLANI (Berlin)	
Die Auszüge aus den Psalmenhomilien des Origenes in den gedruckten Ausgaben des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts.	303
Samuel FERNÁNDEZ (Santiago)	
Division and Structure of <i>De principiis</i> : Towards a New Critical Edition	323

III. THE RECEPTION OF ORIGEN'S THOUGHT IN THE WEST DURING THE MIDDLE AGES AND THE RENAISSANCE

Bernard POUDERON (Tours)	
La réception d'Origène à la Renaissance: Pour une typologie .	339

Jon F. DECHOW (Salem, OR)	
Origen's Shadow over the Erasmus/Luther Debate, Part II	367
Ercole ERCULEI (Bonn)	
Origen in the Philosophy of Giordano Bruno	395
Paul B. DECOCK (Cedara)	
Origen, Bernard of Clairvaux and the "Ordering of Love"	405
Mark W. ELLIOTT (St Andrews)	
Tracing the Romans Commentary of Origen in Abelard's: Appearance and Reality	415
Tobias GEORGES (Göttingen)	
"Summus Christianorum Philosophorum": Origen as Christian Philosopher in Peter Abelard	431
IV. THE RECEPTION OF ORIGEN'S THOUGHT IN THE WEST UNTIL JOHN SCOTTUS ERIUGENA	
Ilaria L.E. RAMELLI (Milan)	
The Reception of Origen's Ideas in Western Theological and Philosophical Traditions	443
Lenka KARFÍKOVÁ (Prague)	
Nature Completed by the Will: Origen and Augustine	469
Augustine Marie REISENAUER (Providence, RI)	
Augustine Gathering the Cosmic Person Origen Scatters	479
Filip OUTRATA (Prague)	
Differing Defenders of Free Will: Possible Origenian Influences in Julian of Aelclanum	489
Andrew M. SELBY (Waco, TX)	
Ambrose and Origen on John the Baptist and the Holy Spirit in the Gospel of Luke	501
Volker Henning DRECOLL (Tübingen)	
With Origen against Manichaeism: Orosius' <i>Commonitorium</i> against Priscillian and the Early Reception of Origen in Spain .	511
Uta HEIL (Vienna)	
Orosius, Augustine and the Origenist Controversy in the West: Some Observations on the <i>Commonitorium</i> of Orosius	525

Gerald BOSTOCK (Perth)	
Origen and Celtic Christianity	545
Manabu AKIYAMA (Tsukuba, Ibaraki)	
Il significato misterioso della profezia nelle <i>Omellie su Ezechiele</i> di Gregorio Magno	563
Miriam Adan JONES (Amsterdam)	
Origen's Authority: Exegetical Borrowings and Doctrinal Departures in Gregory the Great's <i>Expositio in Canticum</i> <i>Canticorum</i>	575
John GAVIN (Worcester, MA)	
"Nothing Is Liable to Destruction": John Scottus Eriugena's Justification of an Origenian Principle	587
Eirini ARTEMI (Patra)	
The Influence of Origen on John Scottus Eriugena concerning "The Return of all Things to God"	597

V. THE RECEPTION OF ORIGEN IN WESTERN MYSTICISM AND LITURGY

Andrew LOUTH (Durham)	
The Reception of Origen's Thought in Western Mysticism.	615
György HEIDL (Pécs)	
Origen, Hippolytus and the Mysticism of St. Ambrose	629
Jane Schatkin HETRICK (Little Neck, NY)	
From Origen to Habsburg Vienna: Musical Treatment of the Text <i>Sub tuum praesidium</i> , a Marian Prayer in Viennese Liturgical Practice (1600-1800).	647
Monica TOBON (Canterbury)	
From Evagrian Prayer to Centering Prayer.	659

VI. THE RECEPTION OF ORIGEN'S THOUGHT IN THE EAST

Olga ALIEVA (Moscow)	
Origen's Protreptics to Philosophy: Testimony of Gregory Thaumaturgus in the <i>Oratio Panegyrica VI</i>	681

Maria Louise MUNKHOLT CHRISTENSEN (Aarhus)	
Origen, Gregory of Nyssa and the Fatherhood of “Our Father”	691
Georgios SKALTSAS (Markopoulou)	
La question de l’extase chez Origène et Grégoire de Nysse . . .	701
Lucian DÎNCĂ (Bucarest)	
L’influence d’Origène sur la pensée théologique d’Athanasé d’Alexandrie.	721
Roberta FRANCHI (Waterloo, Ont.)	
L’influenza di Origene nel <i>De libero arbitrio</i> e nel <i>De creatis</i> di Metodio d’Olimpo.	733
Vladimir CVETKOVIĆ (Göttingen)	
Maximus the Confessor’s Reading of Origen between Origenism and Anti-Origenism.	747
Bogna KOSMULSKA (Warszawa)	
Maximus the Confessor in Photius’s <i>Bibliotheka</i>	759
Kellen PLAXCO (Milwaukee, WI)	
Participation and Trinity in Origen and Didymus the Blind . . .	767
Ioannis PILIOURIS (Frankfurt/M)	
Origen’s Influence on Byzantine Theology: From Origen’s <i>epinoiai</i> of Christ to Palamism	783

VII. MISCELLANEOUS

Pier Franco BEATRICE (Padova)	
The Apostolic Writings in Heracleon’s <i>Hypomnemata</i>	799
Andrew M. HARMON (Milwaukee, WI)	
Motion, Education, and Care: Reading Origen with the Stoics.	821
Paul HARTOG (Des Moines, IA)	
Patristic Departures from Matthew 10,23 with “Flight” Con- nections in Origen	831
Giulio MASPERO (Rome)	
The <i>logos</i> in Us and the <i>Logos</i> in the Beginning according to Origen.	843
Róbert SOMOS (Pécs)	
The Question of Innate Ideas in Origen	857

Anna USACHEVA (Aarhus)

The Exegetical Requirements in Origen's Late Works: Mystical
and Intellectual Aspects of Perfection according to Origen and
His Followers. 871

Ilaria VIGORELLI (Rome)

Σχέσις in Origen. 885

INDICES

Abreviationes. 903

Sacra Scriptura. 907

Origenis Opera. 917

Auctores antiqui et mediaevales 931

Auctores moderni. 959

PARTICIPATION AND TRINITY IN ORIGEN AND DIDYMUS THE BLIND

The Platonizing conceptual tendency implied by the terminology of “participation” lies at the heart of Origen’s ontology and mystical spirituality¹. And yet, Origen appropriated Plato’s already ambiguous concept ambiguously². Origen taught that the Son is good “by participation” and not essentially, and so bequeathed a problematic scheme to his fourth-century heirs. According to one important articulation of Arius’ theology, when the ambiguity regarding “participation” at the heart of Origen’s trinitarian theology coupled with strict adherence to the Father’s being *anarchos*, the result was the Arian heresy. For Arius, the Son is a creature who participates perfectly in the Father’s being just as the Father wills the Son so to participate³.

1. See by way of introduction D.L. BALAS, *The Idea of Participation in the Structure of Origen’s Thought: Christian Transposition of a Theme of the Platonic Tradition*, in H. CROUZEL (ed.), *Origeniana* (Quaderni di Vetera Christianorum, 12), Bari, Università di Bari, 1975, 257-275. References to Origen’s *On First Principles* are to G.W. BUTTERWORTH (trans.), *Origen On First Principles*, Gloucester, MA, Peter Smith, 1973, which in turn relies upon *De principiis (Περὶ ἀρχῶν)*, ed. P. KOETSCHAU (Origenes Werke, 5 = GCS, 22), Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1913.

2. I call the term participation “ambiguous” as a reminder of Aristotle’s allegation (e.g., in *Metaphysics* A,6,987b5-12) that Plato’s concept of “participation” was empty. Instead of having any conceptual value, Aristotle suggests, the relationship of particulars to Ideas that Plato called “participation” is little more than an inexplicable gloss on the Pythagorean notion that particulars imitate numbers. The accuracy and fairness of Aristotle’s claims here and elsewhere regarding Plato’s ontology have remained down to the present a matter of notorious debate.

3. See R. WILLIAMS, *Arius: Heresy and Tradition*, London, Darton, Longman & Todd, 1987; Grand Rapids, MI, Eerdmans, 2002, p. 228, and M. DELCOGLIANO, *Eusebian Theologies of the Son as the Image of God before 341*, in *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 14 (2006) 459-484. DelCogliano notes that, “for Arius ... the various ἐπίνοιαί of the Son are names he bears in view of his participation by grace in certain attributes of God, and as such are not indications of his essence”. Recall that, according to Arius, the Son “was created by the will of God before times and ages, and he received life, being, and glories from the Father as the Father has shared them with him” (Arius, *Letter to Alexander of Alexandria* 3; *The Trinitarian Controversy*, transl. W. RUSCH, Philadelphia, PA, Fortress, 1980, p. 31; Athanasius Werke 3/1, ed. H.G. OPITZ, Berlin – Leipzig, de Gruyter, 1934, Urkunde 6,3, ...θελήματι τοῦ θεοῦ πρὸ χρόνων καὶ πρὸ αἰώνων κτισθέντα καὶ τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ πατρὸς εἰληφότα καὶ τὰς δόξας, συυποστήσαντος αὐτῷ τοῦ πατρὸς). It is important to note that Alexander of Alexandria did not dispute this aspect of Arius’ theology; it seems to have formed a point of agreement between Arius and Alexander that the Son *receives from* and *participates in* the Father. For Alexander, too, the Son is the “image” of the Father’s *hypostasis*

This essay is related to a larger project that reassesses the dogmatic contributions of an “Origenist” on the other side of Arius’ clash with Alexandrian authorities, namely, Didymus the Blind. I will provide some examples of Didymus’ reception of Origen’s trinitarian doctrine in the late fourth century. Alasdair Heron was not the first to notice that we may see Didymus’ fingerprints in Rufinus’ sterilized translation of Origen’s *On First Principles*⁴. So it should not surprise that

(Hebr 1,3), and thus the Son reproduces all that the Father is *except* the distinctive characteristic of being “unbegotten”. See Alexander, *Letter to Alexander of Thessalonica* (commonly referred to as “ἡ φιλάρχος”), *Urkunde* 14,48-52. Williams (*Arius*, p. 223) surmises that “Bishop Alexander and his circle had been using some sort of language about ‘substantial’ unity between Father and Son, or perhaps ... had spoken of the Son enjoying *metousia* or *metochē* of the Father’s life, in a still fairly untroubled Middle Platonic fashion”. For more on the question of the role played by such terminology in Arius’ own theology, see the series of exchanges conducted in R. WILLIAMS’ and C. STEAD’S attempts to negotiate Arius’ philosophical motivations, here listed chronologically: C. STEAD, *The Platonism of Arius*, in *JTS* n.s. 15 (1964) 14-31; R. WILLIAMS, *The Logic of Arianism*, in *JTS* 34 (1983) 60-81; WILLIAMS, *Arius* (1987), especially pp. 215-229; STEAD, *Was Arius a Neoplatonist?*, in E.A. LIVINGSTONE (ed.), *Studia Patristica: Papers presented at the Twelfth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 1995*. Vol. XXXIII: *Augustine and His Opponents, Jerome, Other Latin Fathers after Nicaea, Orientalia, Index Patrum and Table of Contents*, Leuven, Peeters, 1996, 1996, 39-52; WILLIAMS, *Arius*,²2002, Appendix with rebuttal of Stead, pp. 261-266. For some background on the Scriptural roots of the “Hierarchy of Being” in early Christian theology, a good point of departure is R.M. GRANT, *Chains of Being in Early Christianity*, in J.M. KITAGAWA – C.H. LONG (eds.), *Myths and Symbols: Studies in Honor of Mircea Eliade*, Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1969, 279-289. Grant’s account, however, passes over in silence the fourth-century controversies, moving directly from Clement to Pseudo-Dionysius.

4. A. HERON, *Some Sources Used in the De Trinitate Ascribed to Didymus the Blind*, in R. WILLIAMS (ed.), *The Making of Orthodoxy: Essays in Honor of Henry Chadwick*, Cambridge – New York, CUP, 1989, 173-181, at p. 181. Socrates, *Hist. eccl.* IV,25, mentions this work, now unfortunately lost. See A. HERON, *The Holy Spirit in Origen and Didymus the Blind: A Shift in Perspective from the Third to the Fourth Century*, in A.M. RITTER (ed.), *Kerygma und Logos*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979, 298-310, at p. 299 n. 5, and p. 310, for references to passages from Jerome’s *Apologia adversus libros Rufini* that suggest the possibility that Rufinus appropriated Didymus’ commentary in Rufinus’ translation of *On First Principles*. H. CROUZEL, *Origen*, transl. A.S. WORRALL, San Francisco, CA, Harper & Row, 1989, p. 173, discusses Jerome (*Apologia adversus libros Rufini* II,11) as the source of the idea that Didymus’ *scholia* on *On First Principles* were Rufinus’ explanation of the Son’s contemplation of the Father in Rufinus’ translation of *Prin* I,1,8. In *Apologia* II,16, Jerome claims that Didymus “wrote some short commentaries on the Περὶ Ἀρχῶν which [Rufinus translated]; in these [Didymus] never denies that what is there written was written by Origen, but only tries to persuade us simple people that we do not understand his meaning and how these passages ought to be taken in a good sense – and this insofar as it applies to the Son and the Holy Spirit”. See *Opera Pars 3. Opera Polemica*, ed. P. LARDET (CCSL, 79), Turnhout, Brepols, 1982: *et in ipsis Περὶ Ἀρχῶν quos tu interpretatus es libris, breues dictavit commentariolos quibus non ab origene negaret scripta quae scripta sunt, sed nos, simplices homines, non posse intellegere quae dicuntur, et quo sensu in bonam*

Didymus was revising his master's contested position in terms of trinitarian doctrine⁵.

I will begin by providing a brief account of what I take to have been problematic about Origen's use of participation in a trinitarian context. I will then direct attention to a doctrinal pattern in Didymus' comments on the Psalms, in which he may be observed silently correcting Origen's problematic tendencies. I close with a case that invites further exploration into Didymus' role as renovator of Origen's trinitarian thought: Didymus' correction of Origen reappears in the textual tradition of Origen's own Psalms *scholia*.

I. TRINITY AND PARTICIPATION IN ORIGEN

Origen speaks of participation in two undistinguished registers. First, there is the creature's participation in each trinitarian person *qua* cause. The Father, the Son, and Holy Spirit operate in increasingly specific spheres of ontological consequence (e.g., *Prin* I,3,5; I,3,8): the Father causes existence, the Son causes rationality, and the Holy Spirit causes holiness. This arrangement indicates that all things which exist are created by the Father and participate in the Father insofar as they exist; that all things that exist as rational are caused by the Son and participate in the *Logos*' rationality; and that all rational entities which are or are

partem accipi debeant persuadere conatur – hoc dumtaxat de filio et spiritu sancto. Jerome's comment in this regard appears more as a comment made in passing than a veiled accusation of Rufinus, so we need not doubt, I suggest, its reliability as evidence that Didymus did indeed produce such a work, and that Rufinus used it. In fact, that Jerome lets slip that Didymus "dictated little books" suggests Didymus' practice of lectures like those one finds in the Tura papyri. Crouzel notes (*ibid.*) that Jerome must have been overstating his accusation that Origen taught that the Son does not *know* the Father, even if Origen taught that the Son does not *see* the Father. In this, Crouzel is not wrong; but Jerome's exaggerated deduction of the consequences of Origen's anti-anthropomorphism does not detract from the probability that Rufinus was drawing on Didymus' astute clarification of his intellectual master: we have no good reason to doubt that part of Jerome's story.

5. In the first international conference on Origen in 1973, BALAS, *The Idea of Participation* (n. 1), presented a picture of the relationship of Origen's "system" (insofar as Origen can be presumed to have had a "system") to contemporary Platonism. HERON, *The Holy Spirit in Origen and Didymus the Blind* (n. 4), characterizes Didymus' theology as representing a "shift" from that of Origen. It is my suspicion that the role played by what Lewis Ayres calls "grammars of participation" in the shifting sands of fourth-century doctrinal development is underdetermined in scholarship on fourth-century doctrine. See L. AYRES, *Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology*, Oxford – New York, OUP, 2004, pp. 321-324.

becoming holy participate in the Holy Spirit's holiness⁶. So the first register: creatures participate in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit as sources that impart proper characteristics as distinct causes⁷.

In another register of participation, Origen speaks of the trinitarian persons' participation in one another (that is, of the Spirit in the Son and the Son in the Father – the Father alone does not participate in any sense)⁸. This register is implied by a hierarchy of causes; it is a consequence of Origen's ordering of the Son and Holy Spirit (*taxis*)⁹. It is the mode in which Origen may speak of the Holy Spirit's "sharing in" the Son, and the Son's "sharing in" the Father. To quote D. Balas' synthesis of this aspect of Origen's trinitarian model, Origen says that the Father alone "is God in an absolute sense (ὁ θεός, αὐτόθεος), Goodness Itself (αὐτοαγαθόν), Absolute Being (ὁ ὄν)", whereas the "Son is God and good only by participation (μετοχῆ) in the Divinity and Goodness of the Father, and it is the Father who imparts being not only through him but

6. Unfortunately, the evidence is such that not even a scholar as well-informed as J. Dillon can pinpoint Origen's source in the Platonic school tradition for his doctrine that the first three hypostases extend their activities in concentric circles. Dillon can only conclude that he remains "convinced ... that Origen's theory and Proclus' theory are applications of the same doctrine, and that this doctrine was not invented by Origen". See J. DILLON, *Origen's Doctrine of the Trinity and Some Later Neoplatonic Theories*, in D.J. O'MEARA (ed.), *Neoplatonism and Christian Thought*, Albany, NY, International Society for Neoplatonic Studies – State University of New York Press, 1981, 19-23, at p. 23.

7. CROUZEL, *Origen* (n. 4), pp. 181-204, at p. 188, argues at length that Origen's apparent "subordinationism" is merely apparent, and that Origen's trinitarian thought is problem-free in its essentials. He apologizes for this passage in particular (p. 191) by arguing that in suggesting that Origen taught a hierarchy of power in the Trinity, "Jerome, followed by Justinian, projected conclusions onto [this passage] which were personal to them and which Origen did not draw". That may be so, but it is not difficult to see how Jerome and Justinian came to their interpretations of Origen's thought when one reads Origen's remarks in *Clo* II,12-18, a text Crouzel admits poses difficulties. Though Crouzel is not wrong to stress the fact that Origen's trinitarian theology is expressed in pre-Nicene terms, he overstates the case that the discerning reader had no reason to take issue with its terms of expression. Though we should not hold Origen to anachronistic standards, it is going too far to suggest that his trinitarian scheme could not be pressed toward problematic ends.

8. Origen does not speak of the Father's "participating", and, so far as I can find, never speaks of the Son's participation in the Holy Spirit. On the contrary, if Rufinus' Latin is reliable here, he explicitly denies the possibility of the Son's participation in the Holy Spirit. See *Prin* I,3,7: "Let no one indeed imagine from what we have said about the Holy Spirit being bestowed on the saints alone, while the blessings and activities of the Father and the Son extend to both good and evil, just and unjust, that we are hereby exalting the Holy Spirit above the Father and the Son or claiming that his dignity is greater than theirs; for this by no means follows". M. BARNES contextualizes Origen's argument here as opposing a Jewish hyper-pneumatology. See M. BARNES, *The Beginning and End of Early Christian Pneumatology*, in *Augustinian Studies* 39 (2008) 169-186, at p. 182.

9. See, for example, Origen's ranking of the Holy Spirit in *Clo* II,75.

also to him”¹⁰. Origen famously applies John 1’s distinction between “*the* God” (ὁ θεός) and “God” (θεός) to the Father and his Logos¹¹. He explains that, though the Logos is the “archetypal image” of all those “images” formed according to him, “by being ‘with *the* God’ he always continues to be ‘God’”. But, Origen continues, “he would not have this if he were not with God, and he would not remain God if he did not continue in unceasing contemplation of the depth of the Father”.

So far I have sketched two registers of participation discourse in *On First Principles* and *Commentary on John*. Problems arise as Origen consistently fails to distinguish between these two registers of “participation”. He does not, for example, state that when he speaks of the Son’s participation in the Father, it is only a manner of speaking, or that the terminology is used analogously when applied to Son or Holy Spirit. This failure generates more severe consequences if combined with Origen’s alleged statements (bequeathed to us by Justinian) that describe a trinitarian taxonomy of Father greater than Son greater than Spirit: his trinitarian theology appears to necessitate that the Spirit and the Son participate in the Father as creatures do. Finally, if Origen’s characterization of *Logos* as the most perfect contemplator of the Father is placed into the context of an early liturgical tradition in Alexandria that identified the Son and the Holy Spirit with the “angelic” Cherubim and Seraphim of Isaiah 6, the vulnerability of Origen’s equivocating use of participation comes even more sharply into focus¹². For, as the ultimate leader of the

10. BALAS, *The Idea of Participation* (n. 1), pp. 262-263. Balas is here referring in particular to *Clo* II,17. Other passages relevant to Origen’s distinction between God the Father as “absolute” God (ὁ θεός, αὐτόθεος) and the Son as “God” by participation (μετοχή), which includes ascription of every other “self-sufficient” title (Wisdom Itself, Truth Itself, etc.) are found at *Clo* I,59; I,241; II,20; II,51; VI,38; XII,9. Origen developed his trinitarian grammar of participation as an essential component of his anti-modalistic polemic. For more on Origen’s anti-modalist contestations, see R. HEINE, *The Christology of Callistus*, in *JTS* 49 (1998) 57-91 and R. HEINE, *Origen*, Oxford, OUP, 2010, especially pp. 83-103 and pp. 127-144.

11. E.g., *Clo* II,12-18.

12. See, for example, Origen, *Prin* I,3,4 and IV,3,14. The connection between Origen’s remarks here and the Alexandrian liturgical tradition is made, with extensive argumentation, by R. Williams, with a cautious appropriation of the work of G. Dix on the liturgies of Serapion and Mark. Citing a fragment from the “Strasbourg Papyrus” (Strasbourg MS gr. 254), which contains an important witness to the Alexandrian liturgy, Williams remarks that “the Christian sacrifice participates in the heavenly sacrifice – offered by the angelic liturgists, as in, for example, the *Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs* – and the supreme agents of this heavenly offering are the Son and the Spirit, once again allocated roles defined by Jewish angelology, closely comparable to the picture evoked in the *Ascension of Isaiah*”. See R. WILLIAMS, *Angels Unawares: Heavenly Liturgy and Earthly Theology in Alexandria*, in E.A. LIVINGSTONE (ed.), *Studia Patristica: Papers presented at the Twelfth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 1995*. Vol. XXX:

worshipping community, the Son takes up a role of mediation that makes him both worshipped and a *worshipper*. The idiom of “Christ the High Priest” is insufficiently precise: is the Son one of us, the creatures who receive God’s grace, or is he God, the giver of such grace? In these ways, Origen’s use of “participation” left open the possibility, exploited infamously by Arius, that the Son is the most perfect example of a *participant* in the Father’s being. Origen’s conception of the Holy Spirit would remain in no less vulnerable a position¹³.

To trace the legacy and outworking of this problematic would be to work through the early decades of the fourth century¹⁴. In Alexandria, the doctrinal tendency to see the Son as “good according to participation” and not essentially would remain long after the 330s and 340s. For we find Didymus the Blind in the 370s still advocating an opposing view in his lectures on the Psalms, as a way of refuting the “Eunomians”. So now we turn to Didymus.

II. DIDYMUS THE BLIND’S PRO-NICENE RECONSTRUCTION OF ORIGENIAN PARTICIPATION

Didymus makes extensive use of participation terminology, especially in the context of trinitarian theology¹⁵. A thoroughgoing distinction

Biblica et Apocrypha, Ascetica, Liturgica, Leuven, Peeters, 1996, 350-363, at p. 357. Whether Origen influenced or was influenced by *The Ascension of Isaiah* is as suggestive a question as it is elusive, but scholars agree that Origen viewed the status and nature of angels as fluid in opposition to gnostic determinism. See, for example, Origen’s comments on the “Prayer of Joseph” in *Cto* II, 188-190. Origen provides this unique citation of a part of the pseudepigraphal “Prayer” as evidence for his own view that John the Baptist had been an angel who became incarnate to testify to the “true light”, the *Logos*. For the view that Origen at one time thought John the Baptist was the Holy Spirit, see J. LIENHARD, *Origen’s Speculation on John the Baptist or Was John the Baptist the Holy Spirit?*, in R.J. DALY (ed.), *Origeniana Quinta: Historica, Text and Method, Biblica, Philosophica, Theologica, Origenism and Later Developments* (BETL, 105), Leuven, University Press – Peeters, 1992, 449-453. For an argument that the *Ascension of Isaiah* represents an early Christian pneumatology, see L. STUCKENBRUCK, *The Holy Spirit in the Ascension of Isaiah*, in G. STANTON – B. LONGENECKER – S. BARTON (eds.), *Holy Spirit and Christian Origins*, Grand Rapids, MI, Eerdmans, 2004, 308-320.

13. See A. BRIGGMAN, *Irenaeus of Lyons and the Theology of the Holy Spirit* (Oxford Early Christian Studies), Oxford – New York, OUP, 2012, pp. 206-209.

14. It was just such a task that WILLIAMS, *Arius* (n. 3), undertook with masterful expression. By way of disclaimer, allow me to state explicitly that I am not arguing, nor have I implied, that Origen’s theology logically entails Arius’ position. I do think, however, that Arius should be read in the context of Origen’s theological legacy in Alexandria.

15. For tentative exploration of the philosophical background to these terms in *On the Holy Spirit*, see K. PLAXCO, *Didymus the Blind and the Metaphysics of Participation*, in M. VINZENT (ed.), *Studia Patristica: Papers presented at the Sixteenth International*

between God, as substantially good, and creatures, as good-by-reception or participation, is fundamental to Didymus' theology¹⁶. In short, we could refer to this as a "*per se* versus *per aliud*" distinction, and as we have seen, it comes directly from the pages of Origen's *On First Principles*. This distinction, in turn, provides the grounds upon which Didymus identifies the Son and the Spirit with the "Creator" side of a Creator-created pair. By referring to biblical passages that illustrate the Son and the Spirit's "being participated in", Didymus can identify each of them as full members of the divine Trinity¹⁷.

Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 2011. Vol. LXVII.15: *Cappadocian Writers; The Second Half of the Fourth Century*, Leuven, Peeters, 2013, 227-238. In that article I juxtapose Didymus' usage with that of Porphyry and Iamblichus, but I come to no firm conclusions as to Didymus' sources. In the following discussion, for numeration of the text of Didymus' *On the Holy Spirit*, I refer to *Didyme l'Aveugle: Traité du Saint-Esprit*, ed. L. DOUTRELEAU (SC, 386), Paris, Cerf, 1992; I am using the recent translation of the work into English by M. DELCOGLIANO – A. RADDE-GALLWITZ – L. AYRES, *Works on the Spirit – Athanasius the Great and Didymus the Blind* (Popular Patristics Series, 43), Yonkers, NY, St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2011.

16. See DELCOGLIANO *et al.*, *Works on the Spirit* (n. 15), p. 45: "...one fundamental argument provides a theological foundation to [*On the Holy Spirit*]. Didymus argues that the Spirit is the boundless source of all sanctification in which Christians (and all angels) participate, and thus *a priori* cannot be a created reality participating in goodness". The wide-ranging deployment of this concept and its attendant terminology by Didymus in *On the Holy Spirit* provided some of Mingarelli's most compelling evidence in his case for Didymus' authorship of *On the Trinity*, a text that also shows a widespread polemical use of the concept (see L. DOUTRELEAU, *Le De Trinitate est-il l'Œuvre de Didyme l'Aveugle?*, in *RSR* 45 [1967] 514-57, at p. 529: "...these nearly identical formulations regarding the participated Spirit are found nowhere else. Neither Athanasius, nor Pseudo-Athanasius, nor Basil, nor Epiphanius, nor even those who came after him, Jerome and Ambrose, imagined this precision, which permits the explication of certain exceptions in using $\pi\tau\epsilon\upsilon\mu\alpha$ without the article by protecting its divine sense"). Didymus' use of participation even emerges in non-trinitarian contexts, such as his lost work "On Incorporeal Substances", where Didymus uses the concept and its corollary distinctions in his doctrine of the angelic fall. B. BENNETT (unpublished manuscript) has identified a fragment of this text, in which Didymus describes the nature of angels in such a way as to account for how it could have been possible for them to change. Bennett kindly shared his working English translation of the fragment, but he withheld the Greek because it is in process for critically edited publication. Didymus distinguishes between essence and judgment in order to explain the pre-temporal angelic fall. God is immutable in essence and in judgment. All creatures, however, are mutable in one or two ways: according to judgment (i.e., morally) and according to essence (i.e., physically). Angels, not having bodies, are only subject to moral mutability, whereas all other creatures are subject to physical mutability (and those of them with rational souls, i.e., humans, are subject to both moral and physical mutability). At one point in this fragment, Didymus explains that angels are necessarily mutable because "they possess the good accidentally but not essentially". This logic is predicated upon the distinction between God and creature that underwrites Didymus' pneumatology: God is participated in; creatures participate.

17. This forms a major piece of the agenda in Didymus' *On the Holy Spirit*, as Didymus brings biblical text after biblical text into focus with his lens that the Trinity is participated but does not participate.

Equipped with this exegetical strategy, Didymus was quietly and consistently reconstructing Origen's ambiguous spirituality for the purposes of pro-Nicene theology¹⁸. Comparison of Didymus' *Commentary on Genesis* with Origen's first Homily on Genesis (his *Commentary* not being extant) would reveal a striking similarity in terms of what we might call a theology of the image of God¹⁹. The creature is made as an image

18. For extensive comparison of Didymus to Origen on the related theme of deification, see N. RUSSELL, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition* (Oxford Early Christian Studies), Oxford – New York, OUP, 2004, pp. 154-161. Curiously, Russell does not include Jerome's translation of Didymus' *De spiritu sancto* in the texts he analyzes. This is especially noteworthy in his closing remarks on the anonymous *De Trinitate*, which, he claims, departs from Didymus' undisputed commentaries: "... the author of *De Trinitate* sees deification as the work of the Trinity as a whole without any separation of function: the Father creates, sanctifies, justifies, and deifies just as the Son and the Spirit do (*De Trinitate* II,16; PG 39, 868C). The attribution of a deificatory role directly to the Father is unprecedented and points to a developing sense of the one divine nature of the Godhead" (160). RUSSELL might have seen more continuity with the Didymus of the commentaries if *De Spiritu Sancto* had been part of his analysis, since there we find Didymus at work on a doctrine of the soul's participation in the *whole* Trinity, and consequently the *whole* Trinity's indwelling of the soul. See, for example, Didymus, *De Spiritu Sancto* 231, whose argument assumes, rather than argues, the Father's and the Son's "mak[ing] believers holy and good through communion with them", and 257-267, which presumes that the *whole* Trinity indwells the rational soul.

19. Such a theology, in H. Crouzel's words, "is the basis of all of Origen's mysticism": it establishes the possibility of the knowledge of God and provides the mechanism by which the human soul comes to be "formed" in God's image, the Son" (H. CROUZEL, *Théologie de l'image de Dieu chez Origène* [Théologie, 34], Paris, Aubier, 1956, p. 137: "La théologie de l'image de Dieu, fondant la possibilité de la connaissance de Dieu, est la base de toute la mystique d'Origène"). I am thinking specifically of Didymus' *Commentary on Genesis* 57,27-58,1, in *Sur La Genèse: Texte inédit d'après un Papyrus de Toura*, ed. P. NAUTIN – L. DOUTRELEAU (SC, 233), Paris, Cerf, 1976, p. 146: "We have said that 'human' is, properly speaking, mind and soul. It is *that* which, participating in God, from that very participation, becomes God's image, as we have said that virtue represents the one participating in it. Paul, knowing this doctrine, also taught it, speaking in Christ, when he said to those whom he urged to be imaged according to Christ, 'until Christ is formed in you', teaching that the true understanding about Christ, once it is born in the soul, impresses its marks and representations on the soul according to him" (προεἰρηται κυρίως ἄνθρωπος εἶναι ὁ νοῦς καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ· αὐτὴ μετέχουσα Θεοῦ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς μετουσίας εἰκὼν αὐτοῦ γίνεται, καθὼ λέγομεν εἰκονίζειν τὴν ἀρετὴν τὸν μετέχοντα αὐτῆς, ὅπερ ἐπιστάμενος καὶ ὁ ἐν Χριστῷ λαλῶν Παῦλος φησιν οἷς προτρέπεται κατὰ Χριστὸν εἰκονισθῆναι· «μέχρις οὗ μορφωθῆ Χριστὸς ἐν ὑμῖν», διδάσκων ὅτι ἡ περὶ Χριστοῦ νόησις ἀληθῆς ἐγγινομένη ψυχῇ χαρακτηρίζει καὶ εἰκονίζει αὐτὴν κατ' αὐτόν). Compare Origen: "What other image of God is there according to the likeness of whose image man is made, except our Savior who is 'the first-born of every creature', about whom it is written that he is 'the brightness of the eternal light and the express figure of God's substance', who also says about himself: 'I am in the Father, and the Father is in me', and 'He who has seen me has also seen the Father'". See Homily 1 in R. HEINE (transl.), *Homilies on Genesis and Exodus*, Washington, DC, Catholic University of America Press, 1982, p. 65. Didymus (*Commentary on Genesis* 58,3) agrees: "The image of God is his Only-begotten Son. Paul teaches this when he writes, "who is the image of the invisible God", that is, an essential and unchanging

of the eternal and invisible “Image”, Jesus Christ. As the human mind is perfected in virtue, the mind is conformed in likeness to the Image of Christ, the Invisible Image of the Invisible Father. This psychological mechanism is presumed when Origen and Didymus speak of the soul’s participation in God. However, with Didymus, we find extended, explicit emphasis on the object of the soul’s participation as the *Trinity*, not only God the Father²⁰. In this way, Didymus revises Origen’s ambiguous references to the Son’s and the Spirit’s own participation in the Father. According to Didymus’ pro-Nicene position, the Son and the Holy Spirit are participated, but they do not participate.

1. Anti-“Eunomian” Participation in the Lectures on the Psalms

Didymus puts his Origenian distinction to purportedly polemical use in his lessons on the Psalms. I say “purportedly polemical” because, as we shall see, Didymus appears as much to be correcting his own master as mastering the threat of external heresy.

Didymus refers to Jesus’ claim that “I live through the Father” (John 6,57) which, he says, the “Eunomians” want to take as evidence that the Father gave life to Jesus (οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅτι ὁ πατήρ ζωοποιεῖ με, ὡς βούλονται οἱ Εὐνομιανοί). Analysis of Eunomius’ use of John 6,57 confirms that it was a text useful for subordinating the Son to the Father. However, Eunomius had not stressed what Didymus’ interlocutor stresses. Here is Eunomius himself, commenting on John 6,57 in his *Apology* 26.22:

For we confess that only the Son was begotten of the Father and that he is subject to him both in essence and in will (indeed, he himself has admitted that he ‘lives because of the Father’ and that he can ‘do nothing of his own accord’), believing him to be neither *homoousios* nor *homoiousios*, since the one implies a generation and division of the essence and the other an equality...

The use to which Eunomius puts John 6,57 is not the same use to which Didymus’ interlocutors put it. Didymus imagines someone reading

image. For ‘He who has seen me has also seen the Father’” (εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστὶν ὁ Υἱὸς αὐτοῦ ὁ μονογενής· Παῦλος τοῦτο διδάσκει γράφων· “Ὁς ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου”, εἰκὼν δὲ οὐσιώδης καὶ ἀπαράλλακτος· “Ὁ” γὰρ “ἑωρακὼς ἐμὲ ἑώρακε τὸν Πατέρα”).

20. This is the case especially in Didymus’ early doctrinal work *On the Holy Spirit*, dated to around 360. See M. DELCOGLIANO, *Basil of Caesarea, Didymus the Blind, and the Anti-Pneumatomachian Exegesis of Amos 4:13 and John 1:3*, in *JTS* 61 (2010) 644-658, and introduction to DELCOGLIANO *et al.*, *Works on the Spirit* (n. 15).

the verse as though it means that “life” signifies all the attributes one gets as a living being (rationality, mortality, and so on), and that one has such attributes “because of”, i.e., *from*, one’s Father. That Jesus says he “lives through the Father” is supposed to indicate that Jesus is not “Life itself” in the way that the Father is. Jesus is “life” *per aliud*. Here is Didymus’ retort:

If, then, he lives through the Father, he is called “living”, not receiving the name from “life”, but as the source of Life and as the one giving (it) to all. For we say that he has life as the Living One, and we say that [he is] Life not named from Life. For he does not participate in life (οὐ γὰρ μετέχει ζωῆ), but he is Life itself (αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ζωῆ). So it is in *this* way that he “lives through” the Father²¹.

The concluding definition is axiomatic for Didymus’ pneumatology as well as his theology of the Son here: “For he does not participate in life, but is Life itself. It is in *this* way that he ‘lives through the Father’”.

In this passage, then, Didymus’ interlocutor argues that the Son is only divine-by-participation and not divine-by-nature. Didymus’ employment of “self-living” (αὐτοζωῆ) is intriguing. Recall that Origen had reserved the terms αὐτόθεος and αὐτοαγαθόν for God the Father alone²². Note the direct contradiction to Origen’s logic that the Father is the *source* of the Son and the Holy Spirit. For the student who knew Origen well, then,

21. See *Didymos der Blinde, Psalmenkommentar, Pt. 1*, ed. L. DOUTRELEAU – A. GESCHÉ – M. GRONWALD (PTA, 7), Bonn, Habelt, 1969, Codex 2, Lines 2-13: ὁ σωτήρ καὶ κύριος ἡμῶν θεὸς ἅμα καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἐστίν· θεὸς μὲν αἰεὶ, οὐκ αἰεὶ δὲ ἄνθρωπος· πρὸ γὰρ τῆς κτίσεως θεὸς ἦν, ἄνθρωπος δὲ οὐχί. ἐμελλεν δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ὑφίστασθαι σωτηρίας ἕνεκα. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄνθρωπος γενέσθαι διὰ τι ἔχει, τὸ δὲ θεὸς εἶναι οὐ διὰ τι, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ὑπαρξίν καὶ τὴν τοῦ γεννήματος οὐσίαν· οὕτω γὰρ ἤκουσα τοῦ “ζῶ διὰ τὸν πατέρα” μου. οὐ τοῦτο λέγει, ὅτι ὁ πατήρ ζωοποιεῖ με, ὡς βούλονται οἱ Εὐνομιανοί, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο λέγει, ὡς εἰ λέγοι τις· “διὰ τοῦτο λογικὸς εἰμι, ὅτι λογικὸν ἔχω πατέρα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο θνητὸς εἰμι, ὅτι θνητὸν ἔχω πατέρα”. καὶ ἀληθές γε· τὸ “ὄτι” ἐστὶν ἀποδεικτικὴ αἰτία. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν ζῆ διὰ τὸν πατέρα, ἐστὶν λεγόμενος ζωῆ οὐ παρονομαζόμενος ἀπὸ ζωῆς, ἀλλ’ ὡς πηγὴ ζωῆς καὶ ὡς μεταδιδὸς παντί· λέγομεν γὰρ τὸν ζῶντα ζωὴν ἔχειν, λέγομεν δὲ καὶ τὴν ζωὴν τὴν οὐ παρονομαζομένην ἀπὸ ζωῆς· οὐ γὰρ μετέχει ζωῆ, ἀλλὰ αὐτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ ζωῆ. οὕτως οὖν ζῆ διὰ τὸν πατέρα. My rough translation of the first half of this quotation is as follows: “Our Savior and Lord is simultaneously God and human; he is always God, but not always human. For before the creation he was God, but he was not yet human. But he was about to take this (humanity) on for our salvation. And the human part he was able to become ‘on account of something’, but to be the divine part was not ‘on account of anything’, but through his own existence and essence of being begotten. For it is in *this way* that you should hear the verse, ‘I live *through* my Father’. He does not say that the Father ‘gives me life’, as the Eunomians wished, but he says this, as if someone might say, ‘I am rational because I have a rational Father, and I am mortal because I have a mortal father’. And true indeed: the ‘because’ is a demonstrative cause”.

22. See *Clo II,2,17. Der Johanneskommentar*, ed. E. PREUSCHEN (Origenes Werke, 4 = GCS, 10), Leipzig, Hinrichs, 1903, p. 42,32-34).

it would have been clear that Didymus was here using a title for the Son that Origen had admitted. Didymus was using that term to ascribe to the Son a place within the godhead that the Son did not have in Origen's scheme, namely, the position of unparticipating divinity. Didymus' reconstruction of Origen's characterization of the Son as *αὐτοζωή* puts Origen's thought to an end Origen did not support. Though more work is necessary to establish the polemical horizon that frames Didymus' Psalms Commentary, one probable scenario is that there is not one, and that the "Eunomians" in question are those who would read Origen against the spirit of Nicaea. Didymus might have constructed an imagined interlocutor in order to cloak his direct opposition to Origen's problematic statements regarding the Son.

2. *Didymus on Psalm 17,32*

Next we turn to the fragments ascribed to Didymus in the *Catena* on the Psalms. At the time of Mühlenberg's publication of Didymus' fragments from the Psalms *Catena*, the newly discovered Tura commentaries were just beginning to surface in printed editions. A thorough comparison of them with the comments E. Mühlenberg ascribed to Didymus has not yet been made, and scholars are advised not to take Mühlenberg's edition at face value²³.

Nevertheless, at least two of Mühlenberg's fragments (Psalm 17,32) are worth consideration for our purposes here. Psalm 17,32 ("Who is God beside the Lord? And who is God but our God?")²⁴ could be taken to imply that nobody but God the Father should be considered fully

23. See *Psalmenkommentare aus der Katenenüberlieferung*, Band III, ed. E. MÜHLENBERG (PTS, 19), Berlin, de Gruyter, 1979, p. 53. The dating of Didymus' *Lectures on the Psalms*, reconstructed from the Tura papyri, remains vague. A. Gesché can only be as specific as placing them between 370 and 385 (A. GESCHÉ, *La christologie du "Commentaire sur les Psaumes" découvert à Toura*, Gembloux, Duculot, 1962). The lectures were likely produced before the anonymous but Didymean *De Trinitate*, and well after Didymus' *De Spiritu Sancto*. Their relationship to Pseudo-Basil, *Adversus Eunomium* has not been adjudicated.

24. As quoted in Pseudo-Basil, *Adversus Eunomium* IV (PG 29, 709B-C), which is thought by some (A. HERON, *Studies in the Trinitarian Writings of Didymus the Blind: His Authorship of the Adversus Eunomium IV-V and the De Trinitate*, Dissertation, Tübingen, 1972; W. HAYES, *Didymus the Blind Is the Author of Adversus Eunomium IV/V*, in E.A. LIVINGSTONE [ed.], *Studia Patristica: Papers presented at the Eighth International Conference on Patristic Studies held in Oxford 1979*. Vol. XVII.3: *Athanasius, Cappadocian Fathers, Chrysostom, Augustine and his Opponents, Oriental Texts*, Oxford, Pergamon, 1982, pp. 1108-1114) to be by Didymus, the text is τίς θεὸς πάρ᾽ τοῦ Κυρίου; καὶ τίς θεὸς πλὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν; The LXX reads ὅτι τίς θεὸς πλὴν τοῦ Κυρίου; καὶ τίς θεὸς πλὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν;

divine²⁵. Fragment 135 argues that the Son should not be put on the level with the “other gods” because he is the creator. The full text reads as follows:

For no one is truly and properly “god” except by the Word of God, who is also called the Only-Begotten God on account of his being the only one to exist in the same way as God the Father. For all the other Gods are constructed by the presence of the Word of God. For “he called them ‘gods,’ to whom the Word of God came”²⁶. So the Savior is not “God” as one who participates in divinity, since he is a maker of gods²⁷.

As N. Russell notes, John 10,35 is one of Didymus’ favorite texts to use whenever he wishes to justify his doctrine of deification²⁸. Presumably, it is an exegetical *topos* Didymus took from his reading of Origen. This, I suggest, is a genuine Didymean fragment²⁹.

Another fragment (136) makes the distinction between God-by-nature and God-by-participation. The Psalm must mean that none is God *like God is God*. That is, all entities except God are gods-by-participation. The author is explicit that the Son is not a “god-by-participation”:

25. The gloss on this verse in Pseudo-Basil, *Adversus Eunomius* IV, which HERON, *Studies in the Trinitarian Writings* (n. 24) and HAYES, *Didymus the Blind Is the Author* (n. 24) associate with Didymus’ biblical text, provides a number of texts that show that Psalm 17,32 should not be taken to refer to the Son, but little is offered in the way of conceptual argumentation.

26. Quoting John 10,35.

27. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἀληθῶς καὶ κυρίως θεὸς πλὴν τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου, ὃς καὶ μονογενῆς θεὸς εἶρηται διὰ τὸ μόνος εἶναι ὡς ὁ πατὴρ θεός. πάντες γὰρ οἱ ἄλλοι παρουσίᾳ θεοῦ λόγου θεοὶ κατασκευάζονται. ἐκείνους γὰρ θεοὺς εἶπεν, πρὸς οὓς ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγένετο. ὁ δὲ γε σωτὴρ οὐ μετέχων θεότητος θεός ἐστιν, ποιητικὸς δὲ θεῶν.

28. RUSSELL, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition* (n. 18), p. 157.

29. Other examples of Didymus’ use of John 10,35 in this context could be cited. In a “question-and-answer” passage on Psalm 32 from the Tura lectures, Didymus explains that the Spirit and the Son are simple when considered in terms of their own divinity, existing “without relation” – ἀσχέτως. But whether we consider the Holy Spirit in relation to the prophets or to those who have the diversity of spiritual gifts Paul mentions, then the Spirit may be thought of as “plural”. But this is only a manner of thinking and speaking, and does not mean that the Holy Spirit (or the Son) is actually plural. In this context, Didymus refers to John 10,35 as a gloss on “those who participate in the Son”:
“The Word bears no relation to another, but to God alone, and in a second way to his participants. For ‘he called them “gods”, to whom the Word of God came’” (καὶ ὁ λόγος οὖν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ ὅτε ἔτι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἦν – “καὶ ἦν” γὰρ “ὁ λόγος πρὸς τὸν θεόν” –, οὐδεμίαν ἔχει σχέσιν πρὸς ἄλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν μόνον, δευτέρως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς μετόχους ἑαυτοῦ· “ἐκείνους” γὰρ “θεοὺς εἶπεν πρὸς οὓς ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγένετο”. πρὸς αὐτὸν μὲν ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ἦν. ἀσχέτως οὖν ὁ λόγος αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν θεὸν ἔστιν, σχετικῶς δὲ πρὸς τοὺς μετέχοντας αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο).

Saying that no God is properly God except the Lord means that none is God like our God. For none of those *gods-by-participation* is able to be the Lord Jesus Christ or our God as the Father of the Only-begotten. For “we have one Father and one Lord Jesus Christ” (1 Cor 8,6)³⁰.

With these two fragments, then, we can see Didymus using Origen’s distinction between *per se* and *per aliud* divinity to draw lines where Origen might not have drawn them: between the Father and Son, to one side, and the rest of creation, to the other.

3. *Participation in Origen’s Selecta in Psalmos 134,19-20*

I close with a textual problem, whose resolution, one way or another, bears consequences for how we reconstruct Didymus’ doctrinal significance in the late fourth century. To return to the topic with which I began, R. Williams notes apparent “contradictions” between various statements made by Origen on the question of participation³¹. It may be that things were not as simple as I made them out to be, and that Origen, in his later works, revised his earlier view that the Son participates in the Father. Williams concedes that in the *Commentary on John* Origen “states fairly clearly that the Son is divine in virtue of his participation in the Father’s being...”³². But Williams points to two exegetical fragments “which teach precisely the opposite”: *Selecta in Psalmos* on Psalm 135 (LXX) and a fragment on the Apocalypse³³. It would seem that there was space, in the “late” Origen, at least, for a revision of the former doctrine that the Son participates.

30. Εἰπὼν μηδένα θεὸν κυρίως εἶναι πλὴν τοῦ κυρίου λέγει μηδὲ θεὸν εἶναι τινα ὡς τὸν θεὸν ἡμῶν. οὐδεὶς γὰρ τῶν κατὰ μετοχὴν θεῶν ὡς ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς εἶναι δύναται ἢ ὁ θεὸς ἡμῶν ὡς ὁ τοῦ μονογενοῦς πατὴρ· Ἡμῖν γὰρ εἰς θεὸς ὁ πατὴρ καὶ εἰς κύριος Ἰησοῦς ὁ Χριστός. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐκ παραλλήλου οἱ δύο στίχοι εἰρησθαι δύνανται, καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπιστήσεις.

31. WILLIAMS, *Arius* (n. 3), pp. 142-143.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

33. C. Beeley’s recent account of Origen’s christology, which sterilizes this issue in Origen’s thought, depends upon Williams’ precedent for the use of these two fragments from the *catenae* (C. BEELEY, *The Unity of Christ*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 2012, p. 26). However, Beeley does not follow Williams in treating these fragments as only potentially reliable. Instead, Beeley insists that, on the basis of these two remarks, he is justified in drawing the following interpretive conclusion: “nor does the language of participation ... signal any lessening of divinity in the Son merely because Origen also uses it to refer to the relationship between the saints and God”. Had Origen himself offered such a disclaimer, Beeley’s interpretation might convince, but – apart from these spurious remarks – Origen cannot be found making such an explicit clarification in his undisputed writings.

We may leave aside the *scholion* on the Apocalypse, whose authenticity is so dubious as to warrant exclusion unless the comment on the Psalms can be authenticated with certainty³⁴. The Psalm *scholion*, however, deserves close attention. It is a gloss on the divine title “God of gods”, common to the Psalms. This comment is included in the Migne/Lommatzsch edition in a group of *scholia* on Psalm 135,2 (LXX: “Acknowledge the God of gods, because his mercy is forever”). The text is as follows:

He is the “God of gods”, those “gods”, that is, “to whom the Word of God came”, according to the Scripture that says, “I say that you are “gods”, and, “I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob”, clearly because of the great love and kinship with them. But he is God of the demons according to creation. And the Apostle also says, “even if there are many gods and many Lords in heaven and on the earth...”; and those called “gods” apart from the Trinity are such as they are by participation in divinity. But the Savior is divine not according to participation but according to essence. And the phrase, “because his mercy is forever”, is taken in a way as hymns of praise. For, since he is ever-merciful, similarly those singing hymns say, “Because [his mercy is] forever”, and so forth³⁵.

In the first half of this *scholion*, the author combines John 10,35 and Exodus 3,6 to provide an Origenian gloss on Psalm 135,2. The use of John 10,35 does not help us in determining whether this passage is original to Didymus, since that text was doubtless a text he learned to use based on Origen’s pioneering use of it. The appropriation of Exod 3,6 in this way appears to be unique, so far as I can find. However, the second half of the comment not only resembles Didymus’ consistent teaching regarding the Son as “not participating”; it specifically resembles the comment on the Psalms we reviewed earlier. Recall that there Didymus says that ὁ δὲ γε σωτὴρ οὐ μετέχων θεότητος θεός ἐστιν, ποιητικὸς

34. Though it is possible that Origen wrote on the book of Revelation, all that remains is a shred of evidence that points to his *intention* to write on the book, but none of the text. See J. MCGUCKIN (ed.), *The Westminster Handbook to Origen*, Louisville, KY, Westminster John Knox, 2004, p. 32.

35. θεός θεῶν ἐστιν ἐκείνων τῶν πρὸς οὓς λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγένετο, κατὰ τὴν Γραφὴν τὴν λέγουσαν· Ἐγὼ εἶπα· θεοὶ ἐστε· καὶ, Ἐγὼ θεός Ἀβραάμ, καὶ θεός Ἰσαάκ, καὶ θεός Ἰακώβ. δηλαδή κατὰ τὴν πολλὴν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀγάπην καὶ οἰκειώσιν. Τῶν δὲ δαιμόνων θεός ἐστι κατὰ τὴν δημιουργίαν. Φησὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀπόστολος· Εἴτερ εἰσὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ καὶ κύριοι πολλοὶ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς· ἀλλὰ τοὺς λεγομένους μετὰ τὴν Τριάδα θεοὺς μετουσίᾳ θεότητος εἶναι τοιούτους· ὁ δὲ Σωτὴρ οὐ κατὰ μετουσίαν, ἀλλὰ κατ’οὐσίαν ἐστὶ θεός. Τὸ δὲ, Ὅτι εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τὸ ἔλεος αὐτοῦ, ἐφουμνίας τρόπῳ ἐπιλέγεται. Ἐπεὶ γὰρ αἰεὶ ἔλεεῖ, εἰκότως οἱ ἐφουμνούντες λέγουσιν, ὅτι εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς. See *Selecta in Psalmos (Origenis selectorum in Psalmos)*, ed. C.H.E. LOMMATZSCH [Origenis opera omnia, 13], Berlin, Haude et Spener, 1842, p. 134,19-20).

ὄν θεῶν. That “God” is ποιητικός, generally, is mentioned by Origen in the *Commentary on John* (GCS 10, 34,14), but not in this combination.

Unfortunately, we have only the Migne edition of Origen’s fragmented comments on the Psalms, which amounts to an uncritical presentation of comments ascribed by the scribal tradition to Origen. There is a deep continuity between the tendency of argumentation in Didymus and the Psalm *scholion* that revises Origen’s earlier position. And texts that appear “Didymean” in this way are rarely found in Origen’s undisputed writings – that is, the sound texts of the biblical commentaries and the Greek fragments of *On First Principles* that can be trusted beyond the hostility of their sources. On the other hand, we have something similar to these comments ascribed to Didymus in the Mühlenberg edition of the *Catena*. But if these fragments from the *Catena* are genuinely Didymean, then we have to question the authenticity of the *only* comment in Origen’s *scholia* on the Psalms that goes against his tendency to leave open the possibility that the Son participates in the Father.

In the final analysis, then, two solutions to the problem emerge. Though neither is certain without more evidence from the manuscript tradition, one solution appears more likely than the other. Either the apparently “Didymean” fragment from *Selecta in Psalmos* is original to Origen, who changed his mind at some point in his career regarding the Son’s participation in the Father, or the manuscript tradition for the *Selecta in Psalmos* included, at some stage, a gloss from Didymus under Origen’s name. If the case is the former, then Didymus’ later remarks in his own commentary were restorative attempts based on his knowledge of his master’s better judgments. If the latter, then Didymus’ astute correction of Origen entered into the stream of Origen’s biblical commentary.

I suggest that at least the second half of this paragraph, which asserts that the Savor “is not God according to participation but according to essence”, is a Didymean gloss that has been interpolated into the Origenian manuscript tradition of Psalms *scholia*³⁶. It is just as likely, if not more so, that Didymus’ comments would have been inserted under Origen’s name, either because Origen was better known, or because a sympathetic scribe was using Didymus with Didymus’ own apparent purpose: to save his master from himself.

36. I only suggest that part of this paragraph is probably Didymean because Professor L. Perrone has confirmed that the first half of the paragraph does resemble some of the recently discovered material in Origen’s *Homilies on the Psalms*. So this part of the comment may go back to Origen himself, with an additional gloss by Didymus entering into the picture beginning with the phrase Φησὶ δὲ καὶ ὁ Ἀπόστολος.

The account I have provided invites a deeper search into Didymus' wider doctrinal influence than has been conducted in recent scholarship on Didymus. The few scholars who have extensively engaged Didymus' enigmatic texts have tended to focus on his role as a mediator of Origenian hermeneutics and pedagogy, unintentionally leaving unscrutinized the old impression that Didymus was limited in terms of doctrinal innovation³⁷. As we have seen, attention to Didymus' texts reveals a sensitive mind at work in bringing Origen "up to date" according to Nicene standards through a subtle re-ordering of some of the deepest lines of Origen's trinitarian doctrine. In the quest to discern the reception of Origen's legacy in the late fourth century, Didymus' doctrinal fingerprints may well turn up elsewhere.

Marquette University
 Department of Theology
 Marquette Hall 115
 1217 W. Wisconsin Ave.
 Milwaukee, WI 53233
 USA
 kellen.plaxco@marquette.edu

Kellen PLAXCO

37. With the exception of a few recent articles, the trend in studies devoted to Didymus has been to characterize Didymus primarily in terms of his biblical commentaries, as a school exegete not engaged with contemporary doctrinal controversies. See, for example, W. BIENERT, "Allegoria" und "Anagoge" bei Didymos dem Blinden von Alexandria, New York, de Gruyter, 1972, R.A. LAYTON, *Didymus the Blind and His Circle in Late-Antique Alexandria: Virtue and Narrative in Biblical Scholarship*, Urbana, IL, University of Illinois Press, 2004, and B. STEFANIW, *Mind, Text, and Commentary: Noetic Exegesis in Origen of Alexandria, Didymus the Blind, and Evagrius Ponticus*, New York, Lang, 2010. The accidental impression created by such a trend once took the form of an explicit judgment in Henry Chadwick's review of the then recently published *Sources Chrétiennes* edition of Didymus' *Commentary on Zechariah*. Chadwick reported that the "doctrinal content is generally disappointing and meagre" (H. CHADWICK, Review of *Didymus the Blind*, "In Zechariah", ed. L. DOUTRELEAU, in *JTS* 14 [1963] 183-185, at p. 184). The English translators of Didymus' *On the Holy Spirit* have revised Chadwick's judgment by taking Didymus seriously as a dogmatic contributor. See L. AYRES, *The Holy Spirit as the "Undiminished Giver": Didymus the Blind's De Spiritu Sancto and the Development of Nicene Pneumatology*, in D.V. TWOMEY – J.E. RUTHERFORD (eds.), *The Holy Spirit in the Fathers of the Church: The Proceedings of the Seventh International Patristic Conference, Maynooth, 2008*, Portland, OR, Four Courts, 2010, 57-72; DELCOGLIANO, *Basil of Caesarea, Didymus the Blind* (n. 20); and A. RADDE-GALLWITZ, *The Holy Spirit as Agent, Not Activity: Origen's Argument with Modalism and Its Afterlife in Didymus, Eunomius, and Gregory of Nazianzus*, in *VigChr* 65 (2011) 227-248. I hope to have contributed to the cause of showing that the impression created by Chadwick's judgment that Didymus was uncreative is unwarranted. It is time to revisit Didymus' doctrinal contributions on their own terms.